On October 15, 1997, the Cassini/Huygens mission began a seven year journey across the solar system that culminated in the entry of the spacecraft into Saturnian orbit on June 30, 2004, that is projected to conclude on September 15, 2017. Cassini/Huygens Spacecraft Navigation is the result of a complex interplay between several teams within the Cassini Project, performed on the Ground Data System. The work of Spacecraft Navigation involves rigorous requirements for accuracy and completeness often carried out under uncompromising critical time pressures. There was a clear need for a secure, highreliability/high-availability computational environment to support Navigation data processing. As a part of this effort, security design (based around the cornerstone principles of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) was a critical element in the system architecture. It is a mistaken, albeit popular, notion that security interferes with usability, and that secure systems should be hard to use. This design sought to find the complementary intersection between security and usability, a point where maximal usability and security converged, unhindered by obtrusive security measures while still confident their work is secure. This paper examines the process used to determine the point of maximal security and usability -a "gilded cage" to protect the system users from hostile external threat, while making their experience on the system as user friendly (in terms of unobtrusive security measures) and efficient as possible. We examined system requirements, obtained user feedback, and developed a secure model for the overall system. This secure system model was then augmented to include a model of user activity and data flows. An iterative control system approach was employed to observe user action and data flow and modify the user model accordingly. The goal was to determine what unused parts of the system could be used to compromise security and disallow access to those areas.
I. Introduction
ew systems can require as much resiliency or as much capacity as those computer systems dedicated to the support of Flight Operations projects. These systems, made up of the ground-based workstations, servers, and networks utilized for spacecraft operations, is commonly termed the Ground Data System or GDS. While for some flight projects or project elements there may be little need for more from their GDS than a simple client-server model running over a moderately secure and reliable network, other projects or project elements may push the envelope of current computing technology to provide a robust, capable, and secure GDS environment to fulfill their requirements.
This paper seeks to describe several approaches dedicated to the process of securing the computer systems utilized on the Cassini Ground Data System, in particular the Navigation element. The Cassini/Huygens Mission to Saturn is a long duration flagship exploratory mission that has involved the largest team of navigation engineers ever assembled on one of the most lengthy and complex interplanetary, and subsequently, orbital trajectories ever designed. 1, 2, 3 In order to understand the challenge and scale of spacecraft navigation for this project, it may be helpful to consider this effort against the overall background of the Cassini/Huygens mission. The Cassini/Huygens mission launched on October 15, 1997, and spent the next seven years on a journey crossing the solar system until As a part of these reliability concerns, security was considered to be a significant and critical aspect of reliability in supporting the Navigation effort in this environment. It is the opinion of the primary author that a system that is hardened to be fault-tolerant against intelligent actors will often prove robust against numerous "natural" random failures as well. Moreover, no matter how accurate or how rapid the results were generated by the computational system, if those results were modified by a security compromise, then whether the system produced the right results initially would be of little use to the Navigation team. This particular security model, based on the security principles of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA), was used as a framework for system hardening. As a part of this process, security benchmarks and standardized testing tools along with other regression testing validated that the computational environment met certain confidence levels.
To draw an analogy from physical systems, these computational systems would be akin to physical mechanisms that could be thoroughly relied upon or trusted, akin to robust fault-tolerant mechanical designs that are used in the automotive, aviation and "space rated" industries. Furthermore, it is a mistaken, albeit popular, notion that security interferes with usability, and that secure systems should be hard to use. This design sought to find the complementary intersection between security and usability, the point of maximal usability (for the users) and security where users could work without being hindered by obtrusive security measures while confident their work is secure.
In particular, this paper examines the process used to determine the intersection point of both maximal security and usability-a "gilded cage" to protect the system users from hostile external threat, while making their experience on the system as user friendly, in terms of unobtrusive security measures, and efficient as possible. From system requirements and user feedback a secure system model was derived. This system model was then expanded to include a model of user activity and data flows. An iterative control system approach was then employed to observe user action and data flow and modify the user model accordingly. The goal was to determine what parts of the system were used by the user community-and more importantly what parts were not-and remove access to those parts of the system that authorized users had no use for, but which an attacker could compromise to gain control over the system or cause damage. This strongly focused approach led to a system that offered the best of both worlds for users, both easy to use and secure, for tour operations.
This paper documents these efforts, covering the security design process for the configuration as utilized for Saturn Orbital Tour Operations from several angles. Working with this model we then examine the system design from outside in, reviewing the network, host and user-level configuration of the environment. We then consider a privilege model of the environment, reviewing the kernel and user mode protections as well as the user access controls in SELinux equipped systems providing additional security between the two, and speculate on virtualized environments with an additional hypervisor (for a virtual machine) layer. This discussion also portrays these efforts compared with industry "best practices" for security and fault-tolerance. We provide an example for similar engineering efforts. While this may be of use to another highly focused Ground Data System for a flagship class interplanetary mission, there is significant applicability for other environments, both in spacecraft GDS and operations where an engineering team has to analyze and process large amounts of data in a secure, precise, and efficient manner under tight time constraints.
II. General Design Principles
She's only a bird in a gilded cage, A beautiful sight to see, -Arthur J. Lamb, Harry Von Tilzer 7 This section describes the design principles and philosophy involved in securing the Cassini Navigation computer environment. These general approaches produce a system prototype (a so called golden image, system image or machine model) which is then tested, and cloned to become a part of the production Navigation system. The details of the CM process, and the mechanisms and specifics used to create and evaluate the system prototype are given in Section III.
The fundamental design goal is the construction of a system that can be trusted and relied upon to perform the difficult task of Spacecraft Navigation. To given confidence levels, this system is fault-tolerant to both random events and intelligent actors. As noted in the introduction above, and it bears repeating, "it is a mistaken, albeit popular, notion that security interferes with usability, and that secure systems should be hard to use." Much of the time this notion is due to a poor implementation of a secure feature, or a security control that was added on as an afterthought to a software system. Failing to consider the needs and requirements of the users of a given system also can lead to this perceived adversarial role of security. Bishop refers to the idea of examining the user interface with the security controls as the Principle of Psychological Acceptability. 8 The ideals of the approach considered here strive to find a complementary intersection §9 between security and usability, an optimal point where these two groups of competing requirements reach their maximum effectiveness. This is akin to the concepts of the Center of Percussion 10 or the so-called "sweet spot" 11 as found in sound engineering, aircraft, and sports equipment designwhere a combination of factors results in a maximum response for a given amount of effort.
This complementary intersection is evaluated against the user utility of the system and the traditional three core concepts of security -Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. These principles define the key concerns in securing a system, not in terms of specific technique or subsystem protected, but in terms of what concerns about the computational environment need protecting. For the Navigation computational environment these traits manifest in a different manner from those seen in military or financial systems:
A. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is "the concealment of information or resources." 12 Confidentiality is critical in military computational systems (in some cases destruction of the system is more desirable than the unauthorized release of information), and of high priority for financial systems, where customer data is not only a crucial part of business operations, but also strong legal regulations come into play for control of consumer information. It is not as critical in the context of the Navigation computational environment. Confidential information for the Navigation § Although conceptually this is analogous to the method of System Reliability Analysis proposed by Youn, and Wang, 7 the approach described here does not use a formal numerical analytical technique. It would be an interesting exercise (far outside the scope of this paper) to extend their work to cover security as reliability. computational environment includes the very important password databases and password authentication system, used for system access as well as detailed information on system and network configuration (which could be used by an intelligent adversary to subvert security). As an example of such information and the importance of Confidentiality as a baseline concern, even the naming of individual machines can be seen to be a Confidentiality issue -because host names may reveal a great deal of information about the underlying network design. 13 For example, consider the, unfortunately typical, hypothetical hostname "cas-web-serv3," which relays the immediate information that the machine is a Cassini server, running a web server daemon, and that there are at least two other Cassini web servers. Another important part of Confidentiality is concerned with the control of information either critical to mission operations or which has not been cleared for public release (although we are a public civilian mission, access to some data sets are restricted).
B. Integrity
Integrity is "the trustworthiness of data or resources,... usually phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change." 14 Integrity is a crucial trait in the Navigational computational environment, as unauthorized or improper modification of the system could lead to very serious problems. As noted above, no matter how accurately or how quickly the results were generated by the computational system, if those results were modified in a security compromise, then whether the system produced the right results initially would be of little use, indeed, be potentially catastrophic to the Navigation team. As noted in the introduction, the sensitivity placed on the accuracy and integrity of the data and corresponding results can not be underestimated with the accuracy requirements for some of the spacecraft maneuvers undertaken by the Cassini Spacecraft. 
C. Availability
Availability is "the ability to use the information or resource desired." 15 Availability in the Navigation computational system, coupled with the reliability constraints from concerns about fault tolerance, had the additional concern that someone might deliberately try to deny access to data sets or a system service. The mechanisms traditionally used to improve reliability, such as redundant units, resilient components, and multiple-redundant systems, are utilized to provide some protection against attempts to subvert availability, but other system tuning and security efforts are made as well. The 24-hour a day, 365-day a year activity calendar of the Cassini mission, along with schedules requiring very rapid turnaround of engineering data sets, make this a very crucial concern indeed. 3 Finding this complementary intersection requires the evaluation of both user requirements and security design requirements. As an example of finding this optimal intersection, consider the often maligned 16 password change requirements of most institutions. Usually eight or more alpha-numeric plus special characters are required, along with other possible password "randomness" requirements. These passwords often have to be changed every 90 to 180 days. As a matter of cryptographic security, the longer the encrypted password hash, the more difficult it becomes to conduct a brute force attack to obtain the unencrypted password. Hand in hand with this, changing the password more frequently helps ensure that even if the password is broken or obtained by some other means, the window of vulnerability is short before a new password is chosen. Considering these security requirements in isolation, absent any user concerns, would lead to ever longer and more "random" passwords -eventually approaching something looking akin to line noise, with changes occurring in shorter and shorter time intervals. However it has been widely known for some time that the user response to such policies tends to decrease the security of the system, as users, unable to remember their ever changing passwords, proceed to pick easily guessable password permutations, or worse still, write passwords down in easy-to-find locations such as under keyboards, or next to, or attached to, computer monitors. Considering both user utility and security design requirements can lead to an optimal solution, such as a 180-day password rotation, or perhaps a password with a smart card (Two Factor Authentication), where users can still remember their passwords and yet change them regularly.
It may be helpful here to clarify the nature of our system privilege model. We consider the classic separation of privilege mode found in most operating systems which separates user mode (unprivileged or application specific) execution code from kernel mode execution code (which contains the underlying operating system internals, device drivers, and critical system functions). From this model comes the analogous distinction between root user and unprivileged user found in Unix based systems. (Although in practice this is an abstraction, this model serves well to describe the function of most Unix/Linux Operating systems -see Appendix A for a slightly more detailed examination.) However, we then seek to add to this model what we will call a user access control layer, otherwise known as a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) layer. This is distinct from the usual Operating System security controls of most modern widely available operating systems, such as MacOS X, or the various Windows or Linux/Unix variants (known as Discretionary Access Control or DAC) in that instead of restricting access to, or 5 otherwise protecting specific processes, files or executables, this MAC layer prescribes a set of roles for each process (and hence user access) to interface with the system. This gives a much more granular access control model that, combined with the regular operating system security controls on the host operating system, gives much better defense in depth (discussed below). These two models can be observed in a symbolic representation in Figure 1 and 
OS Model with MAC Layer
But what approaches are used in construction of secure environments? It can be difficult to determine analytically what optimal security design is. Three principles are used as approaches towards good security design:
A. Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth is a military security term with a long historical pedigree. Instead of a single defensive stronghold or chokepoint, this principle is one of a series of overlapping defenses, 17 one after the other, much like other fault-tolerant multiple-redundant systems. This approach is based on the idea of likening security to a series of overlapping walls, much like that seen in World War I trench warfare or a medieval castle, in that one presents so many barriers to entry that a hostile adversary will choose to pick a less well defended target. Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin characterize this approach in that "…we use a restricted meaning for the word 'secure' when applied to a host. There is no such thing as absolute security. Whether a host is penetrated depends on the time, money, and risk an attacker is willing to spend, compared to the time, money and diligence we are willing to commit to defending the host."
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B. Least Privilege
The principle of least privilege states that processes (and users by extrapolation) should be given the rights and accesses to do the tasks they need to perform -and no more. 19 This avoids many possibilities for the manipulation of a process to get it to do things it was not intended to do. As an example, consider a hypothetical network printing utility that can write to a central spooling directory as a privileged user. It is discovered that by manipulating the input files sent to the printer, it is possible to write to other directories on the system. With some effort and cleverness it may become possible to overwrite critical system files or even get remote access to the system. By changing the permissions of the spooling directory and removing the ability to run as a privileged user, the printing utility can continue to function, without enhanced access, removing its capability to be misused. Least Privilege has many similarities to similar ideas in finance and accounting, such as a bank's safe deposit box repository where two people are required for access, so that no one person can abscond with all of the safe deposit box contents.
C. Vulnerability Removal:
By simply removing vulnerabilities we can avoid many issues inherent in those vulnerabilities. This is analogous to a concept described by Matt Bishop as "The Principle of Economy of Mechanism." 20 If you do not have a web server running on your system, or better still, don't have one installed, you don't have to monitor it and keep it patched against exploits. Making sure that potential vulnerabilities in buggy software are not installed, along with the software itself and its attendance security and maintenance can save much effort and time later on.
How is this optimal intersection point between usability and security determined? An initial first guess is taken based on user needs and security design requirements, and then areas of overlap are noted and iterative changes are then made. These changes are determined based on the area, privilege, and criticality of the change needed. The system is broken down into three areas of concern: external network access, internal host security, and user level Mandatory Access Controls. Priority is typically given to being more strict in the external network access, then internal host security, and then less strict in the user level access controls. For some of these areas, the iteration towards an optimal state is a manual process of examination, test, and user consultation (typically due to the far smaller number of states and the far higher sensitivity of those states). For others, most particularly the user access controls using MAC, this is a mostly automated process. For the user access controls, these iterative changes are made by a means of system identification and estimation in a manner roughly analogous to the Kalman filter method.
21 ‡ ‡ where iterative differences between desired (the predicted value in the Kalman filter) and observed behavior (measured observable in the Kalman filter) use mechanisms to evaluate the difference and then permute the future desired behavior of the next iteration. These areas of concern are broken down in the following consideration.
A. External Network Access
The area of greatest care in the system design, every access point (open network port) is of the highest concern as network access control is the first line of defense against intrusion. (It should be noted that using TCP/IP networking terminology, that we refer to TCP ports, UDP ports, and ICMP types freely as open network ports in this paper.) These system defenses can be seen as akin to the high walls, drawbridge, and moat of a medieval castle. While users will be surveyed for input on desired services, security concerns will predominate over other concerns. For example, although users seem to desire for installation various software applications that like to start a web server running on numerous ports, 22, 23 ,24 # such services are (almost) always disallowed. Those few services that are still available will be expected to be extremely secure against external subversion, such as the SSH remote login/file transfer/port forwarding service. In the external network access area, the weighting of the interplay between user needs and security controls will be very heavily tilted toward security because this represents the first, best chance to block an attacker.
B. Internal Host Security
An area of high concern for the system design, the internal system defenses of a given host machine provide the core set of defenses against external intrusion and rogue users of the machine. Using our previous analogy, these system defenses can be likened to the internal walls, doors, and portcullis of a medieval castle. They include the removal of access to specific areas of the filesystem for unprivileged users, disallowing access to specific services, or removing such services from the system entirely (for example, as mentioned above in part A, the components used to support web servers on the machine). This is one area where usability has to compete with security design as this determines the functionality of a system. A highly secure system that no one can use for their assigned tasks is not very useful. In the internal host security area the weighting of the interplay between user needs and security controls should be nearly equal due to the compelling needs to both keep the system secure, and keep it working as efficiently as possible for the system users. ‡ ‡ Due to the non-Gaussian/non-continuous nature of security vulnerabilities and user requirements, and the difficulty in determining what a least-squares fit would look like for such, it can not properly be called a Kalman filter. These are discrete points in our analysis, not a continuous number line. However, the number of states, especially in the user access control area system identification to be estimated and evaluated is nearly 500,000 security controls which are then multiplexed with thousands of user requirements! An iterative, sequential estimation approach very similar in algorithmic form to the Kalman filter can be seen to be very useful, and at some point in the future it may become very useful to extrapolate this approach to the use of a true Kalman filter-based control system. # The Mercurial revision control system, 8 as well as the ZeroMQ sockets package, 9 and the Tornado web applications server 10 are all examples of packages have been fielded and disallowed or modified for our systems in the past year. The complexity of some of these packages, including the web servers, leaves them ripe targets for exploitation by external attackers.
C. User Access Controls
Of concern for the system design, the user access controls impose a secondary layer of restraint on user activity, above and beyond those the internal host security or the external network access controls do. In our castle analogy this is similar to a jail or other secure room in the fortress such as where the king might sleep. This is an area where (for these general purpose systems evaluated here), usability takes a higher priority than security controls. Due to the very fine granularity of the Mandatory Access Control system, it is important that while controls over critical security concerns should be enforced, considerable care should be taken not to restrict normal user operations (one can very easily make life hard or impossible for the user of the system). As in our analogy, the king will not appreciate being locked in his bedchamber! In the user access controls security area the weighting of the interplay between user needs and security controls will be very heavily tilted toward user access (this is the opposite of the external network access area). Much emphasis on the iterative estimation process to accomplish this is given in Section III below.
III. Practicum
Let us now consider the environment of the Cassini Navigation Flight Operations production environment, and the mechanisms and techniques used to come up with this secure prototype system and observe how this system is then deployed as a part of that environment. Up to this point we have considered a single system in isolation. As it turns out, this is an effective model for which to consider the overall security model of the Cassini navigation Operations Environment. Operations are conducted on a "flat" network topology, consisting of a number of Linux x86 workstations and servers running the exact same version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux. It is kept in lock step with a SystemImager server which provides revision control and CM of the operating system version. (Occasionally during the upgrade cycle a few systems may be held at a prior version to provide a control case in the event of an unexpected failure of the upgrade.) They are apportioned in a "one engineer, one workstation" 3 ratio. All workstations utilize the exact same software set and are able to run all the software, and they are totally interchangeable. As a matter of fact, a backup office is set up with a spare workstation so that in the event of a workstation failure, an engineer can simply walk over to the backup office and continue working! A small collection of Sun Microsystems (Oracle) workstations running Solaris are included in this operations network to provide support for software applications used to interface with the rest of the Cassini project and other parts of the Jet Propulsion Laboratories Flight Operations (FLTOPS) network, including the Deep Space Network (DSN).
A Network Attached Storage (NAS) disk array from Network Appliance (NetApp) provides the file system storage for the Navigation Operations environment, and it serves as a single CM repository and control point for the software and data utilized by the Navigation team. Although this unit could be considered a single point of failure, in practice this is not the case. As Cheswick, Bellovin and Rubin note, this is an example of the idea they point out in their book, "but the wise man saith, 'Put all your eggs in the one basket and-watch that basket!'" 25 This multipleredundant system has dual redundant power supplies (tied into different electrical circuits) on each of its subcomponent systems (network interface head and multiple disk trays) with three multiple-redundant network cards plugged into three different network ports configured as a hot-hot-warm backup of one another. In the event of a failure of one of the network ports one of the other two continue to serve data at a degraded capability. Every component, except the whole system itself, has at least dual, or n+1 redundant components.
Backup is handled by a variety of different systems designed with robust fault tolerance in mind, including the extensive "snapshot" capability of the NetApp NAS, as well as independent disk-to-disk and disk-to-tape backup strategies. Significant archival efforts are also ongoing utilizing disk and optical backup media for online and writeonce storage. In addition, system logs and results from a Tripwire cryptographic file system integrity checker are moved to external log servers continually, providing for robust detection of critical security events. Three serverclass machines are configured as compute and backup servers with approximately twice the memory, CPU-cores, and local disk of the individual user workstations, providing excess capability for challenging computational chores as well as providing support for the few processes that need a single central server to run on. Figure 5 gives an overview of this flat network configuration.
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From this examination we observe that the primary unit of computation is that of the single Linux system image. With the ability to rapidly and atomically verify (down to the file level) that each and every machine has the same exact software set, the practical focus (and effort) of our security design is that of the configuration of this image. Let us consider the general design principles of the three-tiered model we discussed above. Where possible we utilize industry standard scanning tools to get standardized metrics for both the internal and external state of the machine. These tools also let us compare our system model against industry "best practices" to provide direction for improvement.
A. External Network Access
The area under the greatest amount of scrutiny, external network access can be considered an exercise in extreme minimization. It may be broken down into three separate subdivisions, each requiring intense scrutiny. The technique utilized in this area is an iterative one that involves seeking for the absolute minimum number of open network ports, and then, minimizing the amount of data transmitted over those ports. User concerns and requirements are given only secondary consideration due to the criticality of this area. This can involve considerable "user interface issues" with both the user and project management. Lack of understanding of the dangers present in network security can compound the difficulty of minimization in this area. The goal should be to have the absolute minimum number of open ports necessary to have the machine accessible over the network by remote login and network file system. (Typically, machines can have in excess of a thousand open ports, depending on the applications installed and running on the system. The goal is to eliminate over 99% of these ports.) This is necessarily an iterative process, as sometimes when too many ports are closed off and services shut down the machine can not communicate over the network. There may be times as well when certain user applications really do need to have a port opened for them. Two open source toolsets typically used in this effort are Nmap, 26 which serves to perform a comprehensive scan of all of the open ports on a given set of machines, and Nessus, 27 a widely available network security scanner which not only looks at the open ports on a given set of machines, but also examines the software running on those open ports for security vulnerabilities. It does not hurt to use another network security scanner, if available, as sometimes one scanner will find security problems that another scanner may miss. With these vulnerability scanners, configuration problems with the remaining open ports can be fixed, such as when network processes give away too much information about a given system. In this way even if a port can not be closed, it can be hardened to protect the machine. First, we test the running system without host port filtering firewall. Stopping running processes and making sure they remain off after a restart are good, but if possible, removing the software set, as for example a web server package, is better as it prevents easy reactivation and potential ease of misuse of some software components of the application set. Almost all network services can be shut down on a secure system with no real difficulties to the underlying function of the operating system! It should be noted that the model used for the Cassini Navigation Linux platform, only has six open TCP ports and four open UDP ports with the host-based firewall down.
Next, we test the system with the host-based firewall fully engaged. Often times outgoing network traffic from the machine can be traced so that only the responses to the outgoing network traffic will be allowed through the firewall (called statefull packet filtering). This greatly reduces the number of ports that must be kept open on the machine. It also promotes defense in depth in that it works with the process of port minimization noted in the prior paragraph so that even if the host-based firewall were to fail, the underlying machine would still be securely configured. With the firewall engaged, the model used for the Cassini Navigation Linux platform, has only two open TCP ports and no open UDP ports. It also does not even respond to an ICMP ping request. Skoudis gives a great discussion about why one should even block ICMP messages. 28 A further area of concern is that of external access through the several network firewalls. Although as noted in Beswick, et al. 3 control over the firewall protecting our network segment was transferred to the control of a differing group in our organization, it can still be useful to examine system accessibility from external networks. The disadvantage here is that an additional iterative step (perhaps several) may be required to work with the other group supporting the network firewalls.
B. Internal Host Security
An area of great concern, internal host security has the added complication that, unlike external network access, user concerns do have significant impact on the security posture of the machine. Iterating with the user community in this area becomes an ongoing focus of system administration. While vulnerabilities are patched in regular updates, and new security approaches are found to avoid sets of problems, users will request continuing changes to an active system. Some of these changes are win-win for both a security posture and user ease of use. Centralized CM and pushing for the use of a single "known good" version of the numerous software sets installed and deployed on the Cassini Navigation environment make things simpler for both the users and the administrators. By avoiding the problems incurred in having multiple versions of software, each with its own bugs, CM is improved and the users have decreased confusion. Software works by default. However, for many issues, iteration is required. In the Navigation computational environment, the system hardening process involved the characterization of what services and activities the local user population either needed to complete their Navigation Operation critical tasks (e.g. the successful function of mission critical Flight Software and delivery of Operations data sets to appropriate parties), or thought was necessary for completion of their job role (e.g. functional compilers, formatting and visualization tools, editors, viewers and third party software sets), or believed the system would not be useful without such a capability (CD and DVD writing capability, and the ability to mount removable file systems such as CD's, DVD's, and USB drives, in a secure manner without system administrative assistance). With this characterization, there evolved a clear delineation between what actions a user would be expected to perform and what actions a user would never be expected to perform. From this characterization, we removed from the system image those software sets and privileges a user was never expected to need, and we added restrictions so that users would have difficulty in performing anomalous actions. Some categories of fixes or modifications became apparent as useful areas of improvement. CISscan, an internal host scanner from the Center for Internet Security (CIS), 29 was used to perform scans of the internal defenses of the machine. It provided a consistent set of metrics for evaluating host security on a variety of operating system platforms, enabling comparisons between differing machines and operating systems. It represents an effort to develop an industry standard "best practices" series of guidelines for system security based around a consistent set of metrics, with the CISscan tool used to check a given system against such guidelines. Furthermore, CISscan was also very well documented, so that the security implications of each tested system component was well understood and could be evaluated against the requirements of the system. With this tool, although its metrics were somewhat subjective, it was possible to establish a baseline security level, and both ensure that patching and operating system changes continued to meet those metrics, and iterate towards a desired system state. Some of the most crucial points for iterating towards improved system security are: 1) Remove unnecessary permissions on executables: SetUID and SetGID executables can change the user and group of the process that is running them. These program sets represent an extreme security risk with this ability -however, some programs (such as the ones that let users log into the system) must have this ability. As with our study of open network access ports, there are far too many of these programs in the initial installation of almost all operating systems. With an aggressive effort we could reduce the number of these programs from well over a hundred to about forty.
2) Limit installation of new software: every new software package installer can open up new vulnerabilities. Far better to avoid any potential problems entirely by not installing a given set of software at all. Keeping the software set installed with the OS pruned down to a minimum helps minimize many maintenance problems, including keeping the software patched and secure.
3) Shut down or otherwise limit all unnecessary system services: For some minimal operating system configurations, the number of processes running after startup can be counted on one hand. This is a far cry from the average computer, which can have nearly a hundred processes running at any given moment without anyone having logged in. These extraneous processes can represent significant vulnerabilities on a system -especially if they have a network port open as well. 4) Modify key kernel and network data structures: By changing the configuration values of several key kernel and network values, we can significantly harden the machine against denial of service attacks and other failure modes at a cost of moderate increases in memory usage. For example, by decreasing the per-process (number of processes) and user limits (number of users) on the system found in /etc/security/limits.conf, the odds are much lower that a rogue program could harm system function, preventing a denial of service attack by blocking the program from consuming all system resources. Of the issues that may result in user pushback, this is at least an unlikely area to be impacted by negative user feedback.
5) Limit filesystem permissions on critical and untrusted filesystems: Certain critical filesystems are mounted read-only on most machines (such as the ones containing our critical software). Likewise removable filesystems will not be allowed to mount SetUID or SetGID files -because it is too easy to write such a dangerous program which could give the user elevated privileges and be used to circumvent system security, and then have the program put on the machine by a removable filesystem.
C. User Access Controls
As described above, this is an area of considerable concern for the system design, where the interplay between user utility and system security design becomes acute. This is also the area where the use of the sequential system identification and estimation technique we discussed previously in Section II becomes most useful. We consider a subset of the operating system protection systems available under Linux based operating systems, referred to as SELinux. 30 Part of a series of research projects out of the United States' National Security Agency, this series of add-on modules seeks to bring aspects of highly secure operating system designs to the Open Source community. 31 These add on modules are included with the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Operating System distribution from Enterprise 4.
SELinux brings the concepts, as noted, of Mandatory Access Control to Linux. Ordinarily most Linux installations operate at the C2 level § § of the United States' Department of Defense/National Security Agency venerable Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) security classification scheme, also known as the "orange book" (due to the color of its cover) for operating system designs. 32 Such protection provides for a separation of users and data, and permission controls based on Discretionary Access Control mechanisms, such as traditional file permissions. However with the SELinux add-on modules installed, features from the more secure B1 level of the TCSEC classification scheme are implemented. 33 These features which allow for very granular control over user actions, previously were available only on highly secure and expensive computer designs. User access can be granted or revoked to specific file or process, categorized by role. This can allow greatly enhanced security, as users have a second set of controls over their interface with the machine. As an example, the critical system password database, stored in the file /etc/shadow, is normally not readable, but its size and modify times can be read by an unprivileged user of the system (it stores the encrypted passwords of the system). Such information, such as when the file was last changed (i.e. the last time a password was modified) might be useful to an attacker. On a machine running SELinux in the Navigation environment, however that file cannot even be listed by a user of such a system -no information about that file will be returned at all.
Unlike the specialized military and intelligence computer users that utilized the initial designs for Mandatory Access Control, general purpose engineering machine users such as those on the engineering workstations designed for the Navigation computing environment typically do not share the same security concerns or the same expectations about how such machines should function. It is quite possible that using such controls can really handicap users, and, even worse, programs that they may be familiar with may fail in strange or unexpected ways. While such controls can greatly increase machine security, they can make the user experience miserable, or simply untenable.
Fortunately mechanisms in SELinux exist to iteratively identify such difficulties before the system is placed in its locked down "secured" configuration. Once the base policy is configured, (considering our discussion in Section II, consider this the a priori "best guess") one can run the system in so called Permissive mode. Unlike the usual restriction mode (termed Enforcing), violations of the Mandatory Access Controls will be logged. but the system and its users will continue to run as if the MAC system was not actually on. These violations can then be compared, much in a manner of how the Kalman filter examines the difference between the measured observables and the predicted values, and the permission controls (acting much like a filter) can be modified with these changes (residuals in the Kalman method). Over time, with sufficient use, the system will converge to a solution which represents a model of user activity on the system. This may be compared to the method of making the winter time "snow angels." 34 The use of the system by the users may be compared to a person moving their arms and legs about on the snowy ground. After a while the impression left by the users captures the set of their actions on the system just as the "snow angels" captures the motion of the person on the ground. Those behaviors associated with the impression are then fed into the user model. From this process, the machine may then be locked down to prevent behavior not associated with the user community (outside of the impression). This is the final goal of this process. Figure 6 and 7 describes a similar iterative process as it proceeds over time.
For Cassini Navigation, this iterative process ran in a straightforward if lengthy manner once properly set up. The strict policy definitions (our base policy with definitions and the framework for setting up our user environment) were not available for our version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux, so the open source master reference policy and attendant modules were downloaded and installed. 35 We found that numerous configuration issues were helpfully avoided by performing a clean install from this master reference policy, rather than trying to upgrade the default targeted policy on the system. † †36 (However, many hours were spent trying to determine by trial and error that this was what needed to be done!) From this effort an initial "best guess" for the rule sets governing operating system function was chosen. We then decided to break the iteration process into two separate modules to provide clean separation between changes needed to have the computer system and its processes running correctly and efficiently, and changes needed to allow users to utilize the system effectively. This seemed to be an effective approach similar to our simplified OS privilege model mentioned above in Section II. It should be emphasized here that, while this effort has been described as an iterative control process, it is still necessary to observe the resultant machine state and conduct manual intervention in some cases. While the estimation of the new permission set can be accomplished by the machine, it can sometimes make wildly inacurate decisions that would effectively allow access to the entire machine and render the SELinux Mandatory Access Control system ineffective (although in principle there are specific critical protections which cannot be overridden during this iterative process, it is good practice to observe what it thinks it is doing). It is also possible that a particular rule may be combined with other rules, perhaps many other rules, or even changes to how the system is set up, and sometimes the addition of intelligent action can quickly resolve a difficulty that would take many iterations for the estimation process to clear up. This process does not allow the system administrator to stop paying attention to the system! Let us consider our iteration results from the two areas of Mandatory Access Control we discussed above and observe their progress over time to a converged state (zero permission changes needed): 1) System configuration and analysis: The effort to get the computer system and its processes running correctly was significantly more technically difficult and time consuming than the user analysis section. This was especially true early on as many iterations could result in states where the machine would not boot properly, or at 12 all when full Enforcing mode was turned on, and it was not always clear what the problem was without turning full Enforcing mode on. This lead to many chicken and egg type problems early in this effort as there was little clear sign that the system could be made to work at all. This initial effort can be an exhaustive trial and error process, especially if you are using a policy and a version of SELinux that is not installed by default. (Thankfully Red Hat has solved these problems in later versions of its Enterprise operating system!) Once these problems were solved, the estimation iteration process worked effectively, although it took some time to converge on a known good state. Each iteration was a cycle of examining the error message output, making the appropriate changes to the security model's configuration, and building a new configuration, which took between 15 minutes and an hour, with testing afterwards to ensure the operating system was working normally. Fortunately, this effort should not need to be repeated until a significant update of the operating system occurs. Due to numerous places, especially in the beginning, where overt manual interference with this process was required, there are several spikes in the data and one iteration, #13 where the iteration process had to be run again with no changes, however at last a converged state was reached. Although these permission changes are not an exponential decay in iterative changes that one might see from a true Kalman filter, a rapidly decreasing curve of changes can be discerned in the convergence shown in Figure 5 . 2) User configuration and analysis: The user analysis section tended to bear out the described estimation approach. The user community of engineers was drafted to serve as test subjects for this effort, with those users most likely to push the envelope, in terms of unusual system activity, considered a priority for this testing. Over the course of two months of testing of user activity and several iterations, a fully functional working solution emerged. Iterations used the same cycle as given in the system modification section, however an added complexity was getting the opportunity to get the users on the Cassini Navigation network to log off their machines. This lead to an iteration about once every two weeks. This period seemed to be a good midpoint for determining most of a users interaction with the current iteration of the rule set. This iterative process in Figure 6 is much less smooth, and bears out the non-continuous nature of these permission changes -the large spike in activity at iteration #7 is where the user access controls would finally allow for the use of http clients, and consequently a large number of actions involving those clients then had to be vetted. 
IV. Future Considerations
Looking forward to the evolution of the security threat environment and trying to discern what and how to meet those challenges is an ongoing subject of active interest and research for this author. Although tips and techniques have changed enormously since this author started as a system administrator, the underlying principles discussed here, much like similar baseline principles in other parts of computation, of system minimization and robustness have changed little in two decades, or not at all. These underlying principles are given a great deal of weight here, and although the practical points espoused here may change, the principles will probably remain the same. By way of example from the text, the Mandatory Access Control mechanisms in SELinux are only now reaching widespread adoption in several distributions of Linux, although the underlying models for those mechanisms were formulated by David Bell and Leonard LaPadula nearly 40 years ago. 37 Two areas of particular interest for future study were noted above. First the expansion of these principles and models, especially those used in the SELinux MAC layer, to that of virtualized computation. These setups involve one or more additional layers in the OS security model cited here, and the coordination of security policy between the virtual machine layer and the hypervisor (the control layer above the virtual machines that interfaces the virtual machine systems with the underlying actual hardware) does not have a clear solution yet. Currently virtual computing treats these virtual machines as independent systems from a security perspective, but it is interesting to speculate on some sort of a hypervisor/MAC layer that might serve to improve security for groups of users and processes, on groups of virtual machines.
Another area of interest would be the expansion of this iterative approach to combine it with the formal techniques for Complementary Intersection System Reliability analysis and determine a way to define these sets of problems for a rigorous Kalman filter technique. Although, far outside of what can be accomplished at present, it is possible that in the future an analytical technique might be utilized for solving these sorts of security-as-reliability problems. As noted, there are nearly 500,000 rule sets in the strict configuration for the SELinux modules described here. Considering the inevitable growth of such problem sets, at some point methods similar to these may become necessary.
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V. Conclusion
We have examined the principles used to create a safe and effective environment for the users of the Cassini Navigation computational system. "Although the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," 38 we have observed no major or minor security instances over the 15-year life of the mission. We strived to bring the best possible security posture to a set of general engineering workstations -without preventing the users of those workstations from getting their jobs done. Looking at core principles of computer security and Operating System security privilege models, we consider three approaches to creating a more secure system. An approach based around similar ideas in the Kalman filter method is used to refine a series of improvements to the security posture of our systems. With the redundancy of these protections, a failure of one security control does not lead to the failure of the whole system. From this technique, we look at some actual refinements made to our computing environment. We then speculate on future developments in the field.
This paper was undertaken with the hope that the ideas presented here would find purchase with the system engineers and system administrators of the Astronautical community. With austere budgetary realities we are presented with the difficult problem that although our work can be very crucial, and the penalties for failure very high, we do not have significant resources with which to perform such a task. The authors' desire is to promote security as an aspect of reliability -that we might be able to trust our computer systems in the same way that when we drive a car, we trust its brakes. Although considering the state of computer security today this may seem hopeless, there are computer systems that have been designed in such a manner. The avionics of a modern, fly-bywire aircraft bear testimony to this approach, this level of trust. 39 It would be good if other computer system designs could more completely follow such rigor.
Appendix A A discussion of expanded OS privilege levels
A more detailed discussion on operating system privilege levels seems appropriate. The models presented in Section II are useful for discussion, and are similar to the system model of early batch processing operating systems, however most modern operating systems are significantly more complex. The typical Linux x86 workstation environment has been characterize with four potential privilege levels, supported in the x86 CPU, as seen in figure 11 . 40 It should be noted here that another name for the application layer is user layer. One can see one of the other names for the Kernel layer, that of "Ring-0". Each of these levels has corresponding restricted access to greater privilege, helping to segregate processing of crucial operating system function from that of less critical code, such as user programs. This allows for failures in less privileged areas to be prevented from causing failures in more critical areas of the operating system. Interestingly enough, the "Ring-1" and "Ring-2" layers are not really used in Linux (colored in grey in figure) , which leads to a permission model very similar to the one presented above in Section II, as seen in figure 12. 
